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What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention?
are values representational states that work differently from
epistemological truths? are our perceptual experiences representational
states? To simplify the inquiry, i will theoretically divide the
questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction
between signitive and practical intention and the latter pertaining to
the objectivity of a value. The texts i will refer to are husserl’s ideas and analysis.
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What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? are values 
representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? are 
our perceptual experiences representational states? how can we explain an 
instinctive evaluation that is performed without the support of any reflection?
i would like to begin my analysis with a story whose protagonist is a kouros, 
a statue bought by an art dealer, gianfranco becchina. Federico Zeri, the 
well-known art critic, was called to make an evaluation concerning the 
authenticity of the statue. although the other members of becchina’s 
trustee board had already acknowledged the high value of the kouros, Zeri 
denied its authenticity in the blink of an eye. he looked at the kouros and 
felt ‘an intuitive repulsion’. Later on, other tests confirmed what Zeri felt 
(gladwell 2005, 3-8).
i use this story to display the sense of my research. in fact, it seems possible 
to claim that on certain occasions an evaluating intention can be brought 
out via ‘an intuitive repulsion’. For this reason, my aim here is to describe 
the moments of this kind of intention. the questions that might arise from 
this challenging topic are several: Wow does the intentional structure of 
this ‘intuitive repulsion’ look like? is the value a bodily concept which comes 
before the representation of the object itself? is it possible to appreciate the 
value of a melody without consciously listening to it? if we come in a room 
and our attention is completely focused on another object, are we able to 
appreciate the value of the melody spread in the room as well?  
to simplify the inquiry, i will divide the questions into two groups: the 
former concerning the distinction between signitive (or largerly meant 
epistemological) and practical intention and the latter pertaining to 
the objectivity of a value itself. i would like to understand if a practical 
intention can be independent from any signitive or epistemological basis 
and, accordingly, if values might be described independently from the 
objects holding a value. the texts i will refer to are husserl’s works of ideas i 
(1913) and analysis Concerning active and Passive Synthesis (1917-18) which casts 
light on husserl’s idea of intentionality after the transcendental and genetic 
turn. these texts can be taken as a reference point to explain the analysis 
of validity from a static to a genetic viewpoint. in this way we could get an 
overall phenomenological definition of validity pointing out its differences 
respect to a signitive acts and showing its in fieri nature.
as for the critics, husserl scholars seem to be divided on this issue: 
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Schuhmann as well as melle maintain that this debate can only lead to an 
aporetic conclusion. drummond and rinofner-Kreidl consider the possibility 
of carrying out a two level analysis of evaluative acts as intentional acts 
where it is possible to distinguish the experience of a valuable object from 
the corresponding values themselves. in contrast to liangkang, who retains 
evaluating acts unable to constitute their own noema, crowell considers the 
so-called emotive ‘target’ as a phenomenologically ‘normal’ object (which he 
calls ‘objectity’) that can have worth as a proper value. Finally, Smith (but 
naturally there are many other scholars involved in this debate) construes the 
object of values as a universal object grasped by the categorical experience of 
the universal. Seemingly husserl’s theory of values, as rinofner-Kreidl and 
Crowell noted, presents some deficiencies that cannot be solved or accepted. 
In this paper I would like to expound these deficiencies focusing on practical 
intentionality and the meaning of value.
as already mentioned, the meaning of ‘value’ in itself can be understood by 
the analysis of Husserl’s idea of intentionality. Indeed, a value is defined by 
husserl as the content or noema of an intentional act of evaluation. the issue 
here is to examine which kind of intentionality, if any, belongs to evaluating 
acts. as these acts are commonly considered instinctive and spontaneous, 
their intentionality is problematic  because they seemingly arise without 
any proper intentio (husserl, 1970,107-112).  they simply mean their own 
objects in the absence of any ‘aware’ intention. For instance, when i enter 
a room, a melody makes me feel well, though i may not be listening to it 
attentively. this means that i (or my body) can evaluate it positively while i 
am doing something else. in this case the evaluating act functions without 
a proper intention and (probably) a proper object. Something happens 
(listening to a melody) and i recognize it with a feeling but my aware 
intention is addressed toward another actual object (talking to another 
person, for instance).
in paragraph 97 of ideas i husserl explains the moments that constitute a 
simple act through the following example. “We are looking at a tree over 
there which is now motionless and then appears blown by the wind and 
which is also presented in greatly different modes of appearance as we, 
during our continuing observation, change our spatial position relative 
to the tree”(husserl 1983, 236, 201). this observation encompasses a 
plentitude of information that is given in the unity of one perception. yet 
if we want to exclude the natural attitude which provides phenomenal 
and mutable information of the tree in order to describe the act just from 
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a phenomenological point of view, we should stayed focused on what 
remains of the former sensuous perception, that is, on the “inherent 
component of the pure mental process” (husserl, 1983, 237). in fact, seen 
phenomenologically, the tree becomes that mental phenomenon by means 
of which i perceive the tree. Phenomenological analysis focuses on what 
affects the perception as a pure mental object.
according to ideas i the act of perception can be divided into two 
components: noesis and noema. noesis is the ‘subjective’ side of an act and 
noema the ‘objective’ side. Noesis is the field of constituting multiplicities 
and noema is the field of constituted unities. From a phenomenological point 
of view the noesis is not the colour of the tree which changes according to 
the intensity of the light, but the colour itself as we perceive it. on the other 
hand, the noema of a colour corresponds to the “sensed colour”. this latter 
is an identical and unchangeable unit encompassing all the data pertaining 
to the perception of colour as they are grasped by the noesis.
husserl holds that we have different kinds of noeseis and noemata that are 
displayed within a specific hierarchy (Husserl 1983, 246, 249, 255). “There 
are presentations simpliciter, modifications simpliciter of perceptions. but 
there are also presentations of a second, third and essentially of any level 
whatever” (husserl 1983, 246). it is possible to intend an object in different 
ways (phantasy, memory, representation), but all these ways can be figured 
out and collocated in a specific order. To every way of perceiving objects 
there belongs a characteristic of reflection: “with respect to remembered 
things at the second level of rememberings, there are reflections on 
perceivings of just these things belonging to the same level” (husserl 
1983, 247). For instance, we cannot seize upon the object-tree by memory 
if we have not represented it yet. the various noeseis by which an object 
can be given are all built up on signitive or doxic acts, that is, on acts 
capable of performing the representation of the sensed object. “the being-
characteristic simpliciter is the primal form from which all being modalities 
are derived” (Husserl 1983, 251). We can perceive the tree and reflect on its 
properties only after we have recognized it as an object, as something which 
stands in front of us. therefore, i can have an overall idea of the tree thanks 
to the mixture of different levels of my perception. each noematic level is 
“an ‘objectivation’ of the data of the following level” (husserl 1983, 247, 249). 
i can draw a pleasant feeling from the sight of the tree because this feeling 
generally arises after i have seen the tree standing before me and have 
instantly processed this representation.
hence evaluating objectivations are possible only on the basis of signitive 
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or positing acts. “a perceiving, fantasying, judging, or the like, founds a 
stratum which overlays it completely we have different noemata or senses 
in the stratified whole which is called a concrete mental process of valuing 
by being designated according to the highest level within it” (husserl 
1983, 231). every evaluating act which appears just like a second kind of 
act is based on the signitive stratum of perception, judgement and fantasy 
(husserl 1983, 232). consequently, an evaluative act does not seem to hold 
its own object as it always requires the representations of a signitive act 
in order to evaluate something. the value seems to be a different kind of 
signitive noema. For example, if i enter a room and i listen to a melody, the 
process of evaluating this melody is probably grounded on the realization 
that a melody is being played and then i can evaluate it. the melody is a 
signitive object that is predicatively given to the act of evaluation. the 
actual object of the evaluating act is a “value-objectiveness” (husserl 1983, 
232) (Wertkobjectivität), that is, a state of affairs (Sachlage) founded on the 
predicative form of the object that holds a value.
nevertheless, in every value there must lie a distinction between the 
valuable object (i.e., the predicatively given object i am evaluating) and 
the value-objects (husserl 1983, 232). the former is the noema of a signitive 
act by which i know what i am experiencing and the latter is a noematic 
modification of what I am experiencing. Accordingly the noema of an 
evaluating act is an intentional object in a twofold sense. “We shall speak of 
the mere thing which is valuable which has value characteristic which has 
value quality; in contradistinction we speak of concrete value itself or the 
value-objectiveness (Wertobjectivitaet). […] the value objectiveness involves 
its mere materially determinate thing (Sache). it introduces a new objective 
stratum, the value quality” (husserl 1983, 232, 198). as a matter of fact, 
any value is an actual and axiological object, that is, the thing as valuable, 
with its value-characteristics and value-qualities, and the concrete value 
in itself, which should be considered as a value-objectiveness and a mere 
predicatively formed value-complex.
For this reason in §37 husserl mentions the expression ‘evaluative 
perception’ (Wertnehmung)  as the first step on which the noema of value 
is built up as a “value-objectiveness”, namely the object as it is vaguely 
perceived. Hence, on this first founding act, another process of objectivation 
takes place. accordingly, the concrete value in itself, as opposed to 
the thing as valuable, seems to hold a peculiar intention and its own 
“Setzungscharaktere”, namely its own way of positing an object and taking a 
position with respect to it.
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in his analysis Concerning Passive and active Syntheisis, husserl makes a 
distinction between passive and active intention. this distinction can be 
helpful to understand the ‘object’ of a plain perception (Wahrnehmung) as 
opposed to the one of a value perception (Wertnehmung). this distinction 
should be conducive to form a whole idea of the lived experience as 
something static that is taken in itself and in that moment as a unit which is 
always in fiery since it is experienced by a living subject.
The first layer of a passive intention is mainly a perception (Husserl 2001, 
92). Within a passive perception, noesis consists in an act of uninhibited 
intentions and the noema is the free fulfillment of several modes of being. 
Since in this correlation there is no hierarchy, consciousness can be directed 
wherever it likes without being regulated by any kind of knowledge. to 
use the example given before, while i am staring at the tree, probably a lot 
of intentions impinge upon my staring. i can be compelled to touch the 
tree’s trunk or just to like its shape. all these stimuli are simultaneous 
and force my consciousness toward different directions. it is likely that 
my consciousness can only knowingly follow a part of these, and only a 
few uninhibited intentions can become real (active or actual) intentions. 
the hierarchy, as it was displayed in ideas i, comes into action only when 
consciousness decides to choose among the interwoven, uninhibited 
intentions through an active acceptance.
the active acceptance corresponds to the ego taking a position as a decision 
‘for or against’ the uninhibited intentions. in this case we have an active 
intentionality where, as stated before with ideas i, the doxic or signitive act 
holds a primal position. in the hierarchy the noesis there is a ‘yes or no’, 
and its noema is what has been judged as ‘yes or no’ with respect to the 
perceived content.
“The noetic Yes and No […] arises from taking a position specifically as 
judging. as with every mode of consciousness, we have a noematic correlate. 
here, of course, this correlate is the noematic valid and invalid arising in the 
objective sense” (husserl 2001, 134).
The first step of an active intention is the process of validation as 
confirmation (Bewahrheitung) or verification (Bewährung) of the perceptual 
concordance (husserl 2001, 143). the perceptual concordance is exactly 
that balance between what is given to consciousness as self-giving and 
the presentation of what is expected to be presented to consciousness. in 
that sense the confirmation that lies behind the very first step of an active 
intention seems to be essentially a normative act of regulation by which the 
first balance can be restored (Husserl 2001, 150).  
3.
Passive and Active 
Intentionality: the 
Blink of Validity
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here something more is added to ideas i. in this hierarchy the former act of 
an active intentionality is still a signitive one but, in contrast to ideas i, it 
springs from a validation act. according to husserl passive intentionality 
turns into an active one by a judgment of acceptance and its first noema 
ends up being what is accepted as valid or invalid. let us take the previous 
example: mary is staring at a tree absentmindedly. after a while her passive 
intention is translated into the decision to do something. Whatever this 
doing is about, it always passes through a decision and a judgment. She 
decides to see its shape or rejoice over its sight or evaluate its beauty. What 
ignited the motor of this decision to accept a very specific intention among 
many others?
When someone is absentmindedly staring at a tree, she is exposed to a free 
horizon of expectations where all uninhibited intentions are possible. then, 
the ego actively takes up a position of judging (or talking, or fantasying etc.) 
and “appropriates what is now concordantly given as being simpliciter. active 
acceptance is what carries out a peculiar appropriation, determination, 
thereby establishing this being as valid for me from now on”. (husserl 2001, 95)
to understand this acceptance, it is necessary to go through its moments 
as they appear in the flow of time. In fact the analysis of perception is 
also “an analysis of temporal modes of givenness” (husserl 2001, 150). 
the moments of this unit are always made up of time. as husserl writes 
“We have the stream of givennesses in lived-experience, givennesses that 
are strung together temporally” (husserl 2001, 148). every moment is 
made up of impression, protension and retention. impression represents 
the presentification of a temporal being, that is what is given to the 
subject, in that moment by shadows and uncertain forms. Protention is 
the expectation of the future. it “designates the second aspect of genetic 
primordial lawfulness that strictly governs the life of consciousness” 
(husserl 2001, 739). it represents what we could see or expect to see. it 
constitutes a kind of norm or rule about what we are experiencing. in fact, 
while we are experiencing the surrounding, we build up an idea of what 
we are perceiving and expectations are precisely the presentifications of 
the idea we have created from the former glimpses. Finally, retention is 
the empty presentation of what we have already felt. it is the passive law 
built on the memories just collected in our mind (husserl 2001, 114). this 
empty representation can be fulfilled by the contents given with evidence. 
“the objects found in such a retention are disclosed through a process of 
bringing them to intuition [….] they are disclosed in the synthetic transition 
to an appropriate intuition in the consciousness of them. this is obviously a 
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synthesis of confirmation” (Husserl 2001, 150).
therefore, the decision made by the ego is mainly determined by these phases. 
The confirmation granted by the unit of continual concordance allows the 
ego to go ahead with its intentions following the proper hierarchy. this is the 
way in which the consistency of empty presentations, presentifications and 
expectations can be achieved. the noema of validity can be acquired because 
“the perceptual lived-experience is continuously being fulfilled” in this 
temporal flow. (Husserl 2001, 107)
Perception appears as a process “of streaming from phase to phase […]. 
in each phase we have primordial impression, retention and protention 
and unity arises in this progression by the protention of each phase being 
fulfilled by the primordial impression […]. When this concordance is 
ruptured […] we no longer have a perception in the normal sense” (husserl 
2001, 107).
these moments bring a lawfulness to the act of perception which allows the 
stream to flow. “The original confirmation, in which a presenting object is 
fulfilled in a synthesis of the intended object and the corresponding object 
in itself“, occurs exactly in the present relationship between what i expect 
to see and all that I have presented before. If the expectation is fulfilled by 
the actual presentation, the confirmation is possible and the noema is valid.
in a word, the expectation seems to be the main stimulus of an active 
acceptance and the acceptance is what gives validity to the noema of a 
passive uninhibited intention. the idea of validity seems to be embedded 
in this temporal structure, especially in the expectations which give the 
norm of what has to be fulfilled. These seem to be the moments grasped by 
the very first Wertnehmung. “every belief directed to the future has its truth 
or its falsity prefigured in advance and once and for all” (Husserl 2001, 151). 
the validity of this truth consists in this expectation.
Coming back to the questions I raised in the first paragraph concerning 
the difference between a practical and an epistemological intentionality, 
it is now possible to state that there is a strong interweaving of the two. 
indeed, husserl compares both (along with their noemata, namely, truth 
and value) also when he talks about mathematics. this probably happens 
because, as crowell noted, “husserl equates the normative with the 
rational” (crowell, 2005, 15). here in fact husserl writes: “to elucidate the 
structure of the truth or validity is to elucidate <the decision> in itself […] 
drawing a parallel to the mathematical in itself where it is easiest to detect 
the peculiar trait of validity in itself” (husserl 2001, 150). in this excerpt 
 4.
Conclusion
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it is quite difficult to make a distinction between truth and validity. They 
seem rather to be strung together in analogy with mathematical truths. 
logical rationality is validity and vice-versa. in this overlapping, validity 
seems to be a quality belonging both to a mathematical and a theoretical 
truth. “there are affective motives that also orient and reorient the regard 
in this direction”. the ego resists the inclination of will and “ego responds 
by dismissing it, by declaring [the latter intention] invalid”(husserl 2001, 
96, 56). validity is what the ego ‘declares’ to be true. it appears to be that 
temporal shadow which overlays a logical act. “the negating act carried 
out by the ego is a process of striking down validity (ausser-geltung-
Setzen)” (husserl 2001, 96,56). therefore, husserl characterized “deciding-
in-favor-of” by taking-possession-of, appropriation, as being henceforth 
valid, as settled for me from now on. “deciding-against means that such 
a validity, which was somehow expected of us and possibly taken up by us 
earlier, is rejected” (husserl 2001, 97, 56). in addition to being the valuable 
object and the value-object, the value is the noema of what has been 
recognized as valid and it is the content toward which the signitive act is 
addressed. in this sense truth and validity as well as their intentions are 
interwoven because validity is in a certain sense the norm which regulates 
the acquisition of truth, e.g., the concordance gained between what i 
perceived and what is given. taking the example of the tree, the truth 
lies in the consistency between what i expected to see and what has been 
effectively perceived by touching or seeing it, while the value lies in the 
acceptance of this consistency.1 the transition from a static to a genetic 
viewpoint helps to show all the layers of the validity as something that is 
already given to the subject (as signitive act) and as a whole that is in fiery 
and can never be enclosed in just one lived experience.
it remains an open question how this validity is recognized as consistent 
and true. husserl talks about the sentiment of evidence, defined as an adequatio 
rei ac intellectus between what the ego expects to do and what is done 
(husserl 2001,117, 143, 103), but this is the topic of another article.
1 Ibid., p. 277: “As long as the concordance of this coinciding sufficed, the One, the objective 
sense, was characterized in the mode of being. as this thoroughgoing unity, every constituted 
thing for itself in the background of consciousness  exercises an affection on the ego precisely as 
one."
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